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1 5 Public Acceptance of and Benefits from 
Agricultural Biotechnology: a Key Role for 
Verifiable Information 
Wallace E. Huffman1* and Abebayehu Tegene2* 
1Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, USA; 2Resource 
Economic Division, ERS, USDA, Washington, DC, USA 
The on-going genetically modified (GM) food and 
genetically modified organism (GMO) conaovccsy 
threaten to destroy the near-term market for ag-
biotech food and inputs and alter greatly the net 
social benefits that are potentially attainable from 
agriculcural biotechnology. For example, consider: 
1. In February 2000 Greenpeace filed a lawsuit 
challenging the US Environmental Protection 
Agency's decision co allow the release of GM insect 
resistant (Bt) crops. In their news release they stated 
'The EPA should stop [GE] polluters before the 
environment is threatened' (Greenpeace, 2000a). 
2. During the week of 23 March 2000 Greenpeace 
joined over 50 other organizations in a petition to 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) call-
ing on the agency to remove genetically engineered 
(GE) foods from the market because it failed co 
require safety testing or labelling (Greenpeace, 
2000b). 
3. In 1998, the European Union sec our co update 
Council Directive 90/220 covering the deliberate 
release of GMOs. In the spring of 2000, the EU 
decided not co approve any more releases until the 
directive is revised. 
4. During 1999, more than 50% of chc crop 
biotcch field experiments in the UK were disrupted 
by anti-GMO activists. 
Nerdccon (1999) states that the anti-biotech 
activists have achieved a masterful feat in communi-
cation, subverting chc purpose of biotechnology, 
whipping up public alarm and feeding political 
agendas to protccc agricultural markets. 
Advances in science enable new technologies 
and advances in technology increase the demand for 
science. Advancing science and technology arc 
uncertain and costly activities (Holmsaom, 1989; 
Huffman and Evenson, 1993; Huffman and Just, 
2000). Although some new technologies have bene-
fited society greatly, much uncertainty surrounds 
most new technologies. For example, little accurate 
information or knowledge exists about the attrib-
utes, including effects, of new ag-biotcchnologies, 
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and some of the knowledge/information thac does 
exist is public information and some private.1 
Additional research can be undertaken to increase 
the knowledge about the beneficial and harmful 
effects of new technologies, some of which will 
reduce the uncertainty over future irreversible catas-
trophes. Advances in communication and informa-
tion networks make possible rapid worldwide dis-
semination of public scientific discoveries and other 
information. 
Private informacion is the source of asymmet-
ric information, and it leads to an informacional 
advantage co the parry possessing the information. 
In two parry interactions with one parry possessing 
private information, the informed parry can be 
expected to exercise their informational advantage 
whenever they can expect to gain from it, and the 
other parry loses. When experienced parties develop 
intuition about siruarions potentially leading to 
opportunistic behaviour of others, asymmetric 
information can destroy trade/exchange between 
parties where chc potential gains from 
trade/exchange are large. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the 
welfare cffeas of information from communication 
(by interested parties) on the decisions of producers 
of agricultural products and potential users of 
biotechnical inpucs and on consumers of agro-
biotechnical products. Interested panics arc consid-
ered to be private biotechnical companies whose 
profics depend positively on sales of GM inputs to 
agricultural producers and 'environmental groups' 
whose ucilicy depends positively on the quancicy and 
qualicy of environmental stocks. The ag-biocech 
companies provide or distribute information prima-
rily in advertising, news releases, informational 
brochures and web sires, personal contaccs and 
demonscracions. The environmental groups provide 
or distribute information primarily in news releases, 
informarional web sites and demonstrations. Final 
consumers of agricultural products and agricultural 
producers that might use GM inputs are assumed co 
be approximately 'neutral parties' in chis communi-
cation process, but they face important decisions 
relating to their own welfare.2 We acknowledge that 
other possibly more trusted sources of information 
exist for producers and consumers, and the chapter 
focuses on the importance of these sources to good 
decision making.3 We will show thac verifiable infor-
mation plays a central role in socially good decision 
making and that an independent agency should 
score and make freely available verified information. 
This agency mighc also engage in research needed to 
refute or confirm claims made by interested parties 
and ochers. 
The Model 
Many decision makers must or choose to rely on 
information provided by individuals or groups who 
arc affected by their decisions. Furthermore, these 
decision makers may nae know the alternatives 
available and have no control over the information 
provided to them by interested parties. These inter-
ested parties may manipulate by distocring or con-
cealing informacion. For example, farmers rely on 
information, including advertising, provided/dis-
tributed by biotech companies about the expected 
performance of new biocech inpucs, which is quite 
selecrive. These firms are constrained somewhat by 
an interest in repeat sales, but their communication 
may nae reflecc accuracely all known impaccs. 
Consumers rely on information and advertising dis-
tributed by food companies and environmcnral 
groups which seem likely co be tinged with self. 
interest. For example, communications by 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth opposing GM 
foods may exaggerate the potential harm to the envi-
ronment and distract from other important issues. 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and ocher 
environmental groups are interest groups. 
Individuals self-select into these groups because of a 
common interest or goal focused on the environ-
1 Sec Frey (2000) for a discussion of some of the prospeas and problems associated with the use of biotechnology in 
plant breeding. 
2 Hoban (1997, 1999) shows that food safety concerns from biotechnology arc rated relatively low by consumers in the 
USA, Western Europe and japan, relative to microbial contamination, pesticide residuals and antibiotics or hormones. 
3 Although Hoban (1996) reported that ag-biotcch companies and activist groups arc not ranked high by US con-
sumers as a trusted information source, this docs not mean that they never use any of the information in decision 
making. In The Netherlands, a survey of the general public showed that cnvironmcnral and consumer organizations 
were seen as the most reliable sources of information on biotechnology (Hcijs and Midden, 1996). In the UK, 
Marcin and Tait (I 992) found that in a local community reaction to a GMO release, the public chose to support the 
perspective provided by Greenpeace. 
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ment, and achieving the group's goal is a public 
good to its members. Hence, free-riding by one 
member on the efforts of other members is a major 
organizational problem (Olson, 1965; Sandler, 
1992; Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 324-326). Each of 
these groups has resources - largely members' time 
and financial contributions - and their impact is 
affected by organizational efficiency. By choosing 
relatively narrow objectives, these groups reduce 
coordination and decision making costs over organ-
izations chat have diverse goals. Advances in com-
munication and information technologies have 
greatly reduced organizational costs of interesr 
groups and have undoubtedly increased their pro-
ductivity. They are now able to construct low cost 
web sites for displaying their objectives, news releas-
es, shon articles and other information. For exam-
ple, the web site of Friends of the Earth has been 
used to display the locations or addresses of large-
scale plantings of GMO crops in England (Friends 
of the Earth, 2000). These groups can also use e-
mail to rapidly distribute communications among 
members, for example dealing with demonstrations, 
and others, such as lercers opposing GMO use and 
policies.4 
In our model, the two interested parties pro-
vide information in the form of communicarions 
arcempting ro affect agricultural producers' and con-
sumers' decisions. The communications are signals 
which reflect the self-interest and private informa-
tion of each party. Communication is cheap because 
it requires little action on the part of the sender, and 
new information technologies, such as e-mail and 
web sites, have reduced its cost and greatly increased 
the swili:ness of delivery. There remains some mod-
est fixed cost of preparing a communication, but the 
marginal cost of distributi ng it has become approxi-
mately i.ero (Shapiro and Varian, 1999: 19-51). 
Misinformation can be as easily distributed as useful 
information. Computer viruses, like 'I Love You', 
are one example of misinformation which can be 
sent swili:ly around the world and clog the informa-
tion network. In particular, the new information 
technology has greatly expanded the possibility of 
individuals communicating with others whom they 
do not know personally and from whom they may 
have greatly different norms and values. Hence, new 
problems with assessing the quality of information 
obtained from web sites and e-mail have arisen 
(World Bank, 1999: 72-81). Because signalling 
with communications is so cheap, one possible out-
come is char they degrade the quality of information 
to the poinr char communications from interested 
panics are ignored. 
Although the marginal cost of distributing 
information is approximately i.ero, it remains costly 
for decision makers to interpret this information, 
especially contradictory information. Consumers 
and agricultural producers, however, differ in the 
long-term consequences of using bad information. 
Consumers maximize utility subject to a resource 
constraint. When they fail to use objective informa-
tion in decision making, their utility or well-being 
decreases, but this does not generally cause them ro 
exit the economy (except when the consequence is 
death). Producers on the other band can be 
described as long-run profit maximii.ers. If they do 
not use good information, their profits are reduced. 
If they become negative over the long term, most 
likely they will be forced to exit the industry. Thus, 
there is selectivity operating among farmers that is 
generally different from char of consumers. For con-
sumers and producers, the ability ro process infor-
mation and make good decisions is a valuable skiU 
in the sense that it can be welfare or profit increas-
ing, and this ability seems most likely to be related 
to their years of schooling and accumulated experi-
ence as decision makers (Huffman, 2002). Given 
some outlay on information, a decision maker 
might choose ro rely on only one interested party in 
making their decisions, or they might choose to rely 
on several interested parties possessing different 
points of view. There are potential cosrs and benefits 
of each of these actions. 
Although Milgrom and Roberts ( 1986) have 
shown that it is possible for a decision maker to 
make fully informed decisions when rhe decision 
maker relies on one interested parry for information, 
the necessary conditions seem quite restrictive and 
are unlikely to be fulfilled. For example, the inter-
ested party's preferences must be known ro the deci-
sion maker, the information musr be freely verifi-
able, the decision maker must know the factors 
about which the interested party has information to 
be able to detect situations in which information is 
being withheld, and the decision maker must be 
4 Furchermore, advances in cornmunicarion and information rechnologics may have facilirated coalition formation 
among interest groups wishing to oppose ag-biorcchnology for whatever reason (sec Greenpeace, 2000b and che com-
ment by Nenlecon, 1999). 
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able co draw the appropriate inference when infor-
mation is withheld (i.e. he or she must be a sophis-
ticated, sceptical decision maker). These arc 
demanding, but perhaps not impossible aruibutcs 
for successful agricultural producers to possess, but 
they seem to exceed the attributes of most con-
sumers of food. The implication is that for agricul-
tural producers (or consumers) co rely only on infor-
mation providcdldisscminatcd by biotech supply 
firms or environmental groups is unlikely co lead to 
fully informed decisions. Hence, good reasons exist 
for society to be sceptical of claims made by both the 
suppliers of ag-biotcch inputs and the environmen-
tal i merest groups. 
Adding (having or allowing) competition 
among interested parties in providing information 
greatly reduces the restrictions or assumptions nec-
essary for good decision making. The interested par-
ties must be able to convey their information to the 
decision maker, and the decision maker must listen 
to all interested parties who want co convey infor-
mation, chat is, there must be an opportunity for the 
different interests to come out. Ag-biotech firms, 
environmental groups and other interested parties 
seem likely to differ in their ability and effectiveness 
in conveying information that they have. This abili-
ty might be associated, among other things, with 
training, communication skills, personalities, orga-
nizational objective/philosophy and information 
technologies. 5 Rapid advances in communication 
and information technologies arc widely available 
coday, and with the dramatic fall in the cost of send-
ing messages and storing information through new 
networks (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; World Bank, 
1999). accessibility co technologies seems minimally 
constrained by capital or credit. Biotech companies 
arc primarily private companies interested in long-
term profits associated with the sales of their prod-
ucts and the value of the company, and the infor-
mation that they distribute can be expected to be 
consistent with this long-term objective and co be 
constrained by it. Environmental groups arc pursu-
ing non-monetary goals which seem likely co be less 
constraining on their actions and possibly on the 
objectivity of the information they distribute. 
However, the decision makers can now be 
unsophisticated, having little or no idea of available 
options, of issues bearing on the decision or prefer-
ences of the interested parries. He or she mwt, how-
ever, be able to process the information that he or 
she receives, and the information mwt be verifiable. 
Under these conditions, fully informed decisions arc 
possible. The implication is that agricultural pro-
ducers and consumers can make better decisions 
when they use information from diverse and possi-
bly interested parries, provided the information is 
verifiable. 
Much information being discributed these days 
about ag-bioccchnology, however, is not currently 
verifiable. First, biotechnology is advancing rapidly 
so many effects and impacts of new products are 
unknown. Second, a coalition of anci-biocccbnology 
interests has been fo rmed co slow the acceptance of 
ag-biotechnology. T hese groups have raised new 
questions about both the shon-ccrm and the long-
term effects on health and the environment of using 
ag-biotechnology and consuming GM foods. Third, 
some of the activities of the anti-bioccch groups 
seem to be focused on disrupting the experiments 
that might lead to important and useful advances in 
the stock of knowledge about ag-biotcchnology. 
When information is not verifiable, the relia-
bility of information provided by an interested party 
(or panics) depends on the congruity between the 
objectives of the decision maker and chose of the 
interested party (parties). When objectives diverge, 
decision making is difficult, and these complex 
problems have been the topic of optimal incentive 
schemes in principal-agent or agency theory Litera-
ture (e.g. see Holmstrom, 1979; Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1987; Gibbons, 1998). These models are, 
however, well suited only to decision problems with 
few, e.g. two, players. 
When information is not verifiable, communi-
cations by interested panics might lead to unduly 
restrictive public policies being adopted (e.g. ban-
ning GM food production or imports) or it might 
degrade the information content to the extent that 
sophisticated decision makers ignore it. 6 This will, 
however, be generally wdfuc reducing relative to 
S ln dealings with strangers of unknown credibility and no binding conrracc, reputation based on providing accurate 
and reliable information is valuable. Sec Sobel (1985) for one perspective on how a concern about credibility can be 
cxpccccd to affect the quality of information provided co a decision maker over time. 
6 The 4-ycar moratorium on processing patenr applications on transgenic plants and animals by the European Patent 
Office, which ended in December 1999 with a decision by the enlarged board of appeals, seems co have been a 
matter of interpretation of European Union directives and not of verifiable info rmation (Schecrmcicr and Dickson, 
2000). 
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fully informed decision making. For example, social 
cost-reducing inputs for crop production might not 
be used by farmers, or socially beneficial GM foods 
might not be consumed.7 More generally, long-term 
delays in adopting GM technologies because of the 
time required to verify or refute claims by the envi-
ronmental groups about ag-biotcchnical products 
will reduce the expected social and private payoff ro 
R&D in this area. This has implications for where 
the private sector places its future R&D investments 
(Frey, 2000), meeting future food needs and for eco-
nomic growth. 
When a large number of decision makers can 
use or need the same verified information, research 
ro produce this information produces a public good, 
which may be of great social value. The knowledge 
once produced is non-rival, chat is, use by one deci-
sion maker docs not affect the quantity or quality 
available ro others, and it is not (or may not be) eco-
nomically feasible to exclude users. Because the 
opportunity cost of an added user of the informa-
tion is zero and each user's valuation of the informa-
tion is private information, private decisions will 
lead to under provision unless some organizational 
device is used to internalize externalities associated 
with free-riding. The price system is of no (or lirtlc) 
aid in extracting information on the social value of 
verified information or a system to manage ir. 
Institutionalizing a Verified Information 
System 
An ideal verified information system for ag-biotcch-
nology muse provide a mechanism for disclosing pri-
vate information (i.e. information or knowledge 
that exists but is nor available ro everyone), establish 
a process for refuting or confirming claims of inter-
ested parties, and advance the stock of knowledge 
about short- and long-term effects of biotech-
nology. 8 The size of rhc problem is large because ag-
biotcchnology is a global intergenerational public 
good. Biotech knowledge is non-rival and non-
excludablc on a global basis, although particular 
techniques and products have been converted into 
impure public goods through the institution of 
parenting and international patent agreements. 
Furthermore, the impacts (benefits and hazards) arc 
multi-generational - in terms of both potential ben-
efits and hazards. 
Although most of the currently available ag-
biotechnologies have been developed for large-scale 
agriculture and high income consumers, the poten-
tial exisrs for ag-biorechnology to help low income 
councries to meet future food needs (Serageldin, 
1999; National Research Council, 2000) and many 
of the low income countries want access to or to 
have the opportunity ro use ag-biotechnology to 
help meet their future food needs (OECD, 2000). 
Hence, reliable information on ag-biorechnology is 
a public good with potentially large global value. 
Because new ag-biorcchnology has the poten-
tial ro produce benefits and realize hazards over the 
long term, it has an intergenerational dimension. 
This means that sequencing of generations becomes 
important in setting policies and determining bene-
fits; that is, both equity and efficiency dimensions 
are important. The current generation has a 'firsr-
movcr' ad van rage because it can choose an agenda or 
pathway thar best serves its own purposes, even 
though these purposes may be at odds with later 
generations (Sandler, 1997). T his is an especially 
important issue for actions chat are irreversible; for 
example, reducing the earth's biodiversity, and for 
some transfers of genes across unrelated species. Far-
sighted decisions can be promoted by including 
individuals/representatives distributed over wide age 
and standard ofliving ranges in decision making on 
ag-biorech policy and by evaluating costs and bene-
fits of biotechnology in real terms without discount-
ing.9 
Some mechanisms for revealing private infor-
mation lead to better decisions than ochers. When a 
product's 'quality' is at issue, 'untruthful' advertising 
7 As an indication of bendics from agriculrural biotechnology, Falck-Zcpada tt al (2000a) estimate the first-year 
wotldwide economic surplus from the introduction of Be cotton in the USA was US$240 million. The economic 
surplus co herbicide tolerant soybeans is larger (see Moschini tt al, 1999; Falck-Zepeda tt al, 2000b). In the surplus 
computations, biocech inpucs arc treated as having neutral effeccs on human health and the environment. Sec Alston 
tt al (1995) for more information on methods of social cost-benefit analysis dealing with research. 
8 Avery et al (2000) arc concerned with a much narrower issue. They propose a compuccrizcd market for the collec-
t ion and discribucion of subjcccive evaluations of a product of uncertain quality purchased by consume!$. 
9 Discounting seems co be a qucscionable practice for social cost- benefit analysis that spans several gencracions because 
with discounting at any positive race, the current weight co a distant generation's disaster is very small (and frequently 
negligible). Sec Sandler (1997: 62-69). 
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tends to lead co a breakdown in the market for the 
good and no trade occurs because of adverse selec-
tion; for example Akerlofs 'market for lemons' 
(Akcrlof, 1970; Molho, 1997: 19-26). With 'truth-
ful' advertising, monitored effectively by an inde-
pendent body, good market performance is 
obtained. Privately provided information on the 
route to reputation building and repeat sales is less 
effective for simple 'quality' issues (Molho, 1997: 
52-53), and it can be expected to be quite deficient 
in the biotech area where the scientific issues are 
frequently complex, the quality dimensions are fre-
quently changing and the stock of knowledge is 
steadily advancing. 
Private information is best revealed publicly 
through an independent agency which has the 
authority and responsibility to independently verify 
information from interested parties. An independ-
ent agency can go about making objective assess-
ments of information and claims made by interested 
parcies and others. These assessments and evalua-
tions are costly to make because they use scarce 
resources, but once verified the information is a pure 
public good. New information and communication 
technologies have greatly reduced the cost of storing 
and rapidly transferring this information and great-
ly increased the potential accessibility co a global 
scale. 
Advances in the stock of knowledge arc impor-
tant to a successful information verification system. 
le expands the topics, issues or dimensions of the 
knowledge base on which verification can be made. 
The primacy contributors to this activity seem like-
ly to be scientists employed by commercially inde-
pendent institutions and funded primarily by the 
public sector, that is, scientists in 'open universities' 
and possibly government agencies. An open univer-
sity is one where the direction and funding of 
research is not driven primarily by commercial inter-
ests or any other narrow interest group and where 
high scientific-control sca.ndards are in place (David, 
2000; Huffman and Just, 2000). Universities where 
the research agenda and/or funding has been cap-
tured by a single interest group, or one or more large 
private companies (e.g. a life science company), does 
not meet this criterion. Also, if the direction of the 
research programme of a government agency is driv-
en heavily by commercial considerations or has low 
scientific-control standards, it will not meet the cri-
terion of open and objective science either. For sci-
entific discoveries to be highly supportive of the 
information verification system, they must originate 
from an institutional process that signals openness 
and objectiveness to disinterested parties. 
Good research requires considerable time to 
undertake and to verify itself. When the frontiers of 
biological and related sciences are advancing rapidly, 
a significant period may exist where considerable 
scientific uncertainty exists about outcomes, effects, 
impacts or the quality of the information (see, e.g. 
Frey, 2000: 61-79). Interested parties may anempt 
to exploit this information lag which can be to the 
detriment of producers and consumers of agricul-
tural products and to society generally. An efficient-
ly functioning knowledge generation and verifica-
tion system can, however, shorten chis lag. By doing 
so, it creates an environment where interested par-
ties have a strong incentive to reveal voluntarily 
more (rather than less) of the private information 
that they possess and where verified information is 
freely available and easily accessible. The coopera-
tion of interested parties is achievable primarily 
because sophisticated decision makers would infer 
even worse outcomes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). 
No supernational body is likely to be created to 
provide verifiable information which is a global pub-
lic good. Nations have been unwilling to empower 
such bodies with the authority co collect taxes for 
such purposes (Sandler, 1997). For an individual 
country to provide the good, the social benefits 
must exceed the coses. The greater public good 
nature of verified information created by advances 
in information technologies means savings for some 
countries whose decision makers free-ride and weak-
er incentives for any one country to undertake the 
verification activiry. Only one good biotech verifi-
able information system is needed; or given one sys-
tem, the marginal product of another system is zero. 
In the public economics literature, chis has some-
times been labelled as 'best shoe' technology of pub-
lic good supply aggregation (Sandler, 1998). 
Thinking about a global coordination game across 
countries for provision of verifiable information, 
only one country needs to act. The country which 
has the largest expected nee social benefit from 
action, or largest stake, can be expected to provide a 
biotech verifiable information system. This seems 
likely to be a country with a strong research system, 
a large ag-biocech industry, a technically advanced 
large-scale agriculture, large population, high price 
of time (for acquiring and evaluating information) 
and high income. 
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Trust in Public Institutions 
Because a verifiable biorechnology information sys-
tem must be financed by public ra.x collections, ir 
mosr likely will be operated by one or more govern-
ment agencies. 1° For this institutional framework ro 
be successful, it musr have the trust of the public. 
Currently agencies of narional governments dealing 
with similar issues in Wesrern developed countries 
vary in the amount of trust or confidence that the 
public places in informarion that they provide. 
In the USA, public trust is high, bur in 
Western European countries public trust is low. 
Gaskell et al (1999) reporrs on a survey of the US 
public showing a high level of trusr in information 
dealing with the safety of biotechnology provided by 
the USDA and FDA. Also, Hoban (1997) reports 
on a 1994 survey of the US public where respon-
dents were asked to rank 15 different sources of 
information on agricultural biotechnology for trust-
worthiness. The National Institutes of Health and 
Food and Drug Administration ranked very high: 
second and third. 11 (The USDA and EPA were not 
included in the reported rankings.) 
For Europe, Gaskell et aL ( 1999) report on a 
survey of the public in 17 European countries show-
ing low rrusr in national public bodies 'to rell the 
truth about GM crops grown in fields'. European 
governments have accumulated a bad record with 
the general public on food safety issues because of 
their pasr experiences dealing with governments that 
mishandled information on UK BSE meat and 
dioxin contamination of dairy and poultry products 
in Belgium and The Netherlands. Decision making 
by producers and consumers is made more difficult 
when government agencies cannot be trusted as a 
verifiable information source. 
Current public information systems in place in 
the USA and Europe dealing with information on 
agricultural biotechnology are primarily focused on 
regulation for environmental and health safety and 
secondarily focused on proving information ro con-
sumers rhrough labelling. In the USA, the regula-
tion of biotechnology products is through the 
Coordinated Framework established in 1986 
{National Research Council, 2000a) which ties 
together the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The 
framework is based on rhc principle that techniques 
of biotechnology arc not inherently risky and that 
biorechnology should not be regulared as a process, 
bur rarhcr thar the produces of biotechnology 
should be regulated in the same way as products of 
other technologies. Responsibility and jurisdicrion 
over rransgenecic products were assigned as follows: 
(i) planes came under rhe jurisdiction of the Federal 
Planr Pest Act (FPPA) adminisrcred by the USDA; 
(ii) food and feed under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmcric Act (FFDCA) administered by the 
FDA; and (iii) microorganisms and subsrances used 
for pest control under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) and pan of FFDCA administered by the 
EPA. As new biotech products have been developed, 
environmental and consumer groups have expressed 
concerns that EPA rules do not adequately cover all 
the relevant risk issues (e.g. oral toxicity, potential 
for allergenicity) and the USDA should examine 
more thoroughly for risks of new plants outcrossing 
IO The exchange of information and clearing house mechanism under the 1993 Convcncion on Biological Diversity 
have a somewhat diffcrcnc focus. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity has as objectives the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources. The Convention wcnc into effect in December 1993 with 168 signing 
countries (the USA being absent). Anicle 17 requires that members facilitaee the exchange of information relevant 
to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, including results from technical, scicncific and social research 
and other information. Article 18 requires the establishment of a clearing house mechanism to promote and 
facilitate technical and scicncific cooperation (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992; 
www.biodiv.org/chm/conv/cbd_text_e.hanl). Both of these articles arc to facilitate access ro and exchange of infor-
mation on biodiversity around the world, especially information needed to implement provisions of the 
Convention. Although the exchange of information and clearing house activities facilitate voluntary sharing of 
information on biodiversity, they arc nor actively involved in quality concrol or verification. The Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety was adopted in January 2000 to address environmental (but not food safety) impacrs of bio-cnginccred 
products that cross international borders. The Protocol establishes an Internet-based Biosafety Clearing-House to 
help member countries exchange scientific, technical, environmental and legal information about living modified 
organjsms. 
11 However, in 1999, US environmental activists and some consumer groups intensely criticized and demonstrated 
against the FDA's GM food policies (Macilwain, 1999). 
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with wild relatives co produce unusually hardy 
weeds or adversely affect biodiversity (National 
Research Council, 2000a). 
Labelling for GMO content has nor been 
adopted in the USA, hue indircccly information will 
be provided in a new USDA standard for 'organic 
food' labelling (Golan tt al, 2000). For crops, the 
standard means thac the use of generic engineering, 
irradiation and sewage sludge in the production or 
processing stages is prohibited. Although all organic 
farmers and handlers would be expected co abide by 
chc standard, ic remains co be seen whether che stan-
dard can be effectively enforced. 
For countries in the European Union (EU), the 
EU has established polices as directives co member 
nations on environmental legislation. The EU 
Directive on the Contained Use of Generically 
Modified Organisms (Directive 90/219/EEC) and 
on Deliberate Release (Directive 90/220/EEC) 
arrempr co establish a system for controlling the use 
of GM organisms (European Commission, 2000). 
The directives were modelled after the EU's chemi-
cal notification directives. Since these EU directives 
arc nor implemented uniformly across member 
countries and no central monitoring authority 
exists, the system is somewhat loosely controlled. 
Directive 90/219/EEC provides common rules 
throughout the EU for the use of GM microorgan-
isms in research laboracories and industrial facilities 
and provides appropriate measures ro procccc 
human health and the environment from any risks 
arising from activities using GM microorganisms. 
The Directive ouclines appropriate procedures for 
risk management. Microorganisms and activities 
using them arc co be classified by their potential for 
risk and ro containment and control measures. Each 
coumry must designate 'competent authorities' co 
receive information from commercial companies 
and research institutes. These auchoriries must 
organize inspection and other control measures. 
They muse also examine the conformity of notifica-
tions received with che requirements of che direc-
tives. Effeaivc risk management is expected, and ir 
means chat a careful risk assessment of contained use 
muse be made, the appropriate level of containment 
muse be exercised and suitable preventive measures 
muse be taken (European Commission, 2000). 
Directive 90/220/EEC covers deliberate release 
of GM organisms into the environment for research 
and development purposes and chc placement on 
the marker of produces containing GMOs. The 
directive takes a preventive approach, emphasizing 
prior assessment and approval. The main elements 
are: (i) an environmental risk assessment muse be 
carried our before any experimental or commerci.al 
releases of GMOs into the environment; (ii) no 
release can be carried out withour rhc consenr of rhc 
competent authority; (iii) an approval procedure by 
a narion's compercnt aurhoriries should limir exper-
imental releases to ar most 90 days; and (iv) EU 
Community approval is required for commercial 
releases of GM Os (European Commission, 2000). 
The larrcr procedure has been implemented as 
follows (Maurer and Harl, 2000). On receipt of rhe 
notification, the competent authority in a member 
country has 90 days ro either forward the notifica-
tion dossier co chc European Commission with a 
favourable opinion or inform the notifier char the 
proposed commercial release does nor fulfil the 
requirements of the directive. After receiving a noti-
fication dossier, chc Commission immediately for-
wards ic co the competent authorities of all other 
member stares. If no objection is raised by the com-
petent authorities of these states within 60 days after 
the commission forwards the notification, the com-
petent authority char first received che notification 
issues a wrirccn consent co the applicant and informs 
the other member countries and the Commission of 
the consent. When member countries do nor reach 
agreement on a nocificacion, the Commission draws 
on relevant scientific comminees for information 
and opinions. After weighing this information, che 
Commission makes a decision which is binding on 
all EU mcmbers.1z Individual countries arc also 
urged co have effcaive penalties for improper release 
of GM Os, bur none has been established. 
Public confidence in EU GMO policies has 
been undermined by recent information char unap-
proved GMOs have been sold in some EU countries 
and planted by farmers; for example, oilseed rape in 
several countries and conon in Greece and Spain 
(Greenpeace, 2000c,d). The establishment of gov-
ernmental policies that ace unenforceable or weakly 
enforced does nor build public confidence or trusr 
in government. Directive 90/220/EEC is currently 
under revision. 
GMO labelling was adopted by the European 
Commission in 1997. le requires each member 
12 For a company anempting co obtain commercial approval for selling GMOs, rhis is a relatively complicated and 
time consuming procedure in comparison to having one central EU agency make a decision. 
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country ro enact a law requiring labelling of all new 
products concaining GM organisms approved under 
Directive 90/220/EEC (i.e. where there are safecy 
reasons). Under this policy, a GMO is defined as 'an 
organism in which the generic material has been 
altered in a way rhat does nor occur narurally by 
mating and/or natural recombination'. Also, mix-
tures with non-GMOs would indicate rhe possibili-
cy that GMOs may be present. 
The EU's labelling policy has been controver-
sial. First, proven safecy risk evidence is generally 
lacking. Second, the scientific meaning of'none' has 
been controversial in an era where rapid advances in 
scientific instrumentation has made it possible to 
detect ever smaller units, and accidental physical 
mixing of GMO and non-GMO commodities can 
easily occur. Third, the requirements for restaurants 
and caterers is so low as to be virtually useless to 
interested consumers. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed the economics of infor-
mation as it affects the acceptance of and benefits 
from agricultural biotechnology. We have shown 
that the producers and consumers can make good 
decisions on acceptance and use of GM produets if 
there is freely accessible, verifiable information and 
competition in the provision of information by 
interested parties. However, when information is 
not verifiable and decision makers must rely on 
interested parties, achieving good decisions is much 
more difficult. Ag-biotech companies, environmen-
tal groups and others seem likely to have interests 
that d iverge from those of consumers and producers 
and to use private information strategically, especial-
ly when the supply of new GM products is advanc-
ing rapidly. Furthermore, rapid advances in com-
munication and info rmation technologies have 
greatly reduced the cost and increased the speed 
with which info rmation can be distributed. The pri-
vate information that these groups have can cause 
the market for GM products in one way or another 
to collapse. T his may be at considerable loss in social 
welfare. 
We have argued that the services provided by 
an institutionalized information verification system 
operated by an independent body would be a mech-
anism for producing good public information serv-
ices that would have large social value. This institu-
tion would reveal private information, establish a 
process for refuting or confirming claims of interest-
ed parties and advance the stock of knowledge on 
short- and long-term effects of biotechnology. 
Advances in the stock of knowledge arc important 
to a successful information verification system 
because it can expand the topics, issues o r dimen-
sions of the knowledge base on which verification 
can be made. The primary contributors to this activ-
icy seem likely to be scientists employed by com-
mercially independent institutions, funded primari-
ly by the public sector and working to meet 
scholarly and scientific standards. 
The relevant categories of information would 
cover topics consistent with a broad range of income 
and intergenerational interests. To obtain and main-
tain public trust, it must be 'consumer driven' and 
broader than pure scientific issues, although they 
would be one important component. It would, 
however, include scholarly presented and summa-
rized information on ethical, social, economic, envi-
ronmental, food safccy, scientific and trade issues 
dealing with GMOs. 
Verified information is costly to produce, bur 
once provided, it has international public good 
amibutes. We have argued that the advances in 
information and communication technologies have 
increased rhe free-rider problem by weakening the 
incentives for any one country to undertake such 
activities. We suggest that the provision will most 
likely be by some large country that stands current-
ly to receive a significant share of the net social ben-
efits from a verifiable information system for ag-
biorechnology. 
C urrently, public institutions dealing with reg-
ulating GMOs and labelling in the USA have rela-
tively high public trust but none fulfils our concep-
tual view of a verifiable information system. Public 
bodies in Europe are experiencing low public trust 
as an info rmation source, and this is undoubtedly 
making good decision making more difficult. An 
effective information system dealing with biotech-
nology must be managed well in order to provide 
large social benefits. 
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